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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to analysis the role of the State to secure the interests of the State in the management of 
oil and gas in the border of Indonesia. The applied methodology was literature study to collect some reading and 
reviewing written documents. The data then were analyzed through qualitative descriptive analysis. The result of 
the discussion indicates that in accordance with the mandate of the 1945 Constitution that the role and 
responsibility of the State in the management of oil and gas in the border of Indonesia should be oriented to the 
prosperity of the people of Indonesia. However, it is not yet optimal because the Law No. 22 of 2001 concerning 
Oil and Gas is very liberal which is more profitable to foreign investors than the national interest of Indonesia. 
Therefore, it is important for the Indonesian government to revise the Law No. 22 of 2001 concerning Oil and 
Gas for the sake of Indonesian benefits as a state and for sake of the greatest possible prosperity of Indonesian 
people as stipulated by the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia. 
Keywords: Role of State; Management of oil and gas; Indonesian border.   
 
1. Introduction 
Mining management is a vital field and strategy in sustaining the country's foreign exchange. It is stipulated in 
the provisions of Article 33 paragraphs (2) and (3) of the 1945 Constitution which states that “production 
branches which are important for the State and affect the livelihood of the people, controlled by the State and 
used for the greatest prosperity of the people (paragraph 2); and that the earth, water, and natural resources 
contained therein are controlled by the state and utilized to the greatest prosperity of the people (paragraph 3)”. It 
can be said that both paragraphs include to the operation of mining products to be managed to increase the 
welfare of the people 
To realize the mandate of the 1945 Constitution, Indonesia is given roles and responsibilities for protecting 
its gas and oil in appropriate ways. However, the presence of the Law No. 22 Year 2001 concerning Oil and Gas 
is not in accordance with the mandate of the 1945 Constitution. It, then, tends to be even worst in terms of the 
management of Natural Resources of Indonesia. The effect of it makes the industry oil and gas fail to become a 
buffer of national energy security. The worsening of oil and gas natural resources management is marked by 
misguided regulations; the creation of a complicated new bureaucratic chain; inefficiency of cost recovery; the 
existence of mafia game; the declining of nationalism in the oil contract; and the policy of oil and gas earth 
without a roadmap. Those reasons have an impact on the production (lifting) of oil and gas. The production has 
not increased especially since 2004.1 
A misguided fiscal regulation is marked by the abolition of “lex specialis principle” in Production Sharing 
Contract (hereinafter referred to PSC) in the Law No. 22 Year 2001 concerning Oil and Gas. In fact, Indonesia 
becomes the only country to levy tax at the pre-production stage through Article 31 of the Law No. 22 Year 2001 
on Oil and Gas. Indonesia is the only country that levies taxes at the pre-production stage through Article 31 of 
Law Number 22 Year 2001 on Oil and Gas. Indonesia has implemented various taxes and levied them during the 
exploration period including import duties of 15% and Value Added Tax 10% of the value of capital goods 
imported from abroad. This condition has been the cause of the declining attractiveness of investment in the oil 
and gas sector in Indonesia. The consequence of it, new exploration activities on the potential of oil and gas 
resources in Indonesia has no developed as expected.2 
The Law Number 22 Year 2001 on Oil and Gas introduces a new institution called the Executing Agency 
for Oil and Gas (hereinafter referred to BP Migas). However, its function and duties are relatively limited 
because of the legal status aspect of State Owned Legal Entity (hereinafter referred to SOLE). As a legal status 
in the form of SOLE, it is not a business entity because it cannot be eligible to conduct business transactions with 
other parties, especially with the company. As SOLE, business transactions are conducted with third party as 
intermediaries. BP Migas as SOLE has function to control management of oil and gas operations but not a State 
Owned Enterprise (hereinafter referred to SOE) directly involved in production activities. This condition has 
triggered a judicial review through the Judicial Review to the Constitutional Court which ended in the 
dissolution of BP Migas and for the time being its role and function is run by the Oil and Gas Special Unit 
                                                           
1 Juajir Sumardi, Sovereignty of Oil and Gas in  Indonesia, Makassar, Arus Timur, 2017, p..5. 
2 Ibid. 
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(hereinafter referred to SKK Migas) which recently the position and authority carried out also has been 
questioned and raises new legal issues.1 
 
2. Research’s Method 
The type of this legal research was a normative legal research. The normative legal research includes (1) 
research in regards to the principle of the law; (2) research in regards to the system of the law; (3) research in 
regards to the vertical and horizontal synchronization process; (4) legal comparison; and (5) legal history.  
The legal materials of this research were obtained from  primary legal materials, secondary legal materials, 
and tertiary legal materials (supporting materials). The collection of the legal materials, both primary and 
secondary, will then be arranged into a comprehensive arrangement. They will be further made descriptively and  
analyzed qualitatively with reference to the existing principles. 
. 
3.  Map of Amount and Distribution of Oil and Gas in Indonesia  
The distribution of oil and gas in Indonesia can be seen in the map as shown below: 
 
Source:  Adi Maulana, The Indonesian Mineral Resources: Current Outlook, Management and Challenge, 
Makassar, POLTEK NEGERI UJUNG PANDANG, 2016. 
The Map indicates that reserves of energy resources in Indonesia spread throughout the country. However, 
in general, fossil energy resources in the form of oil and gas are mostly available outside Java islands while the 
usage of the energy is concentrated in Java (more than 60% of the population lives in Java). 
The "proven reserves" of current oil and gas are not large. The petroleum reserves after being produced for 
approximately 125 years since the Dutch colonial era until now, have only 4,200 million barrels of oil (million 
stock tank barrels, MMSTB) and are ranked 20th in the world or only about 1.2% of the world's oil reserves. 
Therefore, it is not true if there is a perception that Indonesia's oil reserves are very large and even abundant. 
Natural gas reserves, to distinguish from other types of gas, have been massively produced since the early 1970s, 
Indonesia's natural gas reserves are considerable at 108 trillion cubic feet (trillion standard cubic feet, TSCF), 
ranked 12th in the world and the largest in the Asia Pacific region.2 
The amount of this reserve needs to be stated. In addition to knowing the "wealth" of Indonesian oil and gas 
resources, it is also to know how long Indonesia can utilize these oil and gas resources to support our national 
development. Of the remaining proven reserves of oil, when produced at the current production level of about 1 
million barrels a day, production target in accordance with National Budget 2010 was 965 barrels a day. If 
assuming no additional reserves are found because there are no exploration activities, the oil reserve will run out 
in about 10 years. While the remaining proven reserves of natural gas, if produced at current production levels 
are about 8 billion cubic feet a day. If assuming no additional reserves are found because there is no exploration 
activity, the natural gas reserves will run out in a relatively long time, which is about 37 years. The total gas 
produced is mainly exported, mainly in liquid form (Liquified Natural Gas, LNG) and natural gas, contributing 
                                                           
1 Ibid.p.6. 
2 Review of World BP, Statistical Energy, June 2009 
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approximately 2.3% of the world's gas needs.1 
Besides the numbers of proven reserves of oil and gas as mentioned above from the results of the initial 
exploration activities so far in all regions of Indonesia, it is recorded that there is still potential reserves. The 
potential oil reserves of approximately 3.500 million barrels (MMSTB) and natural gas reserves of 48.7 TSCF.2 
This potential reserve can be upgraded to proven reserves with further exploration activities, which amount 
depends on the level of activity and the exploration success ratio. The success of this proof will be able to extend 
the "life time" of oil and gas energy availability to be used to support development. In addition to the proven and 
potential reserves as described above, from the 66 geological basins study results, it is possible that Indonesia 
still has oil resources of approximately 11,300 MMSTB.3 While the amount of natural gas resources there is no 
data to be used as a reference. 
In this case, the authors argue that perhaps the magnitude of the resource is not only oil but including 
natural gas, so that the amount is "barrel oil equivalent", the writing becomes 11,300 MMSTBOE. The existence 
of such a large resource potential not only provides confidence and pride but also a challenge to be able to prove 
it so that resources can be manifested and used to support national development as an effort to support the 
realization of the welfare of all Indonesian people. The potential for this huge oil and gas resource in addition to 
the potential reserves is also one of the "attractions" for many, including and especially the international oil 
companies (IOC) to prove and more importantly whether it can be produced in a commercial. 
The data described the Energy Distribution Scheme as stipulated above indicates that the Indonesian nation 
is not only aware of the potential reserves of each type of energy resource, but also its location. Indeed, these still 
require further exploration activities using large technology and funding capabilities prove before it can be 
exploited that has economic value. In the oil world in particular and mining in general, it is pivotal to have 
potential reserve data, especially if already in good mapping status. It is leverage in the face of third parties 
whose will cooperate in upstream activities (exploration and exploitation). 
There are 3 (three) important aspects that determine the agreement of upstream oil and gas activities. In 
addition to attractive investment climate (political stability and security), it is the geological aspect, whether the 
geological conditions in the work area is quite "promising" can be found oil and gas reserves. While the 
economic aspect is how the fiscal arrangement is described as "terms and conditions" in the agreement (Contract) 
whether it is enough to provide profits if found commercial oil and gas reserves.4 
In cooperation with foreign investors, there are 3 (three) principles to be regulated – called the management 
authority, the status of foreign investor, and the form of cooperation. This cooperation is temporary as long as 
the State Enterprise as the holder of the mining business authority has not / has not been able to perform the 
activities of Upstream Oil and Gas (exploration and exploitation) assigned by the State to it.5 Indonesia's ability 
to map the potential reserves and the dissemination of various energy resources, which have great potential, 
including oil and gas, as well as the basis of national energy planning, can be sorted out which ones can be 
handled by themselves and which ones can require major cooperation with foreign investors. For the latter of the 
ownership of the data, it can be used as "leverage" in various negotiations. 
 
4. The Role and Responsibility of State in the Management of Oil and Gas in Indonesian Borders 
4.1 The Role of the Management of Oil and Gas 
The simple formulation of Article 33 Paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 
expressly mandates the interests of the people nationally and not locally as follows:     “Earth, water and natural 
resources contained therein, including minerals controlled by the state”. Understanding the phase of controlled 
by the state is the creation and intellectual ingenuity of the founding father. If the phase of controlled by the 
Government is applied in this terms, it is meant that it can be controlled either by central government or by local 
government. Therefore, the mandate for the greatest prosperity of the people can be just a prosperity of the 
people locally (in the area) where the minerals are located. 
The constitutional mandates only gives power to the state, even this is not a "derivative", which means that 
it cannot be re-authorized to anyone, let alone done only by based on a form of law. The juridical effect will be 
null and void, as it is contrary to the higher provisions of the constitution. The notion of the greatest prosperity of 
the people as a mandate of this constitution means that: 
1) the utilization of minerals is only one purpose, that is for the greatest prosperity of the people all over 
Indonesia and not for the prosperity of the local people. If that is meant prosperity of the local people 
certainly formulated in the form of "prosperity of society; 
2) only a state can hold a nation's prosperity nationally, as this is indeed the responsibility of the state; 
                                                           
1 OPEC Annual Statiscal Bulletin, 2008. 
2 See Report of Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, 2008. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Suyitno Patmosukisme, Oil and Gas: Politic, Law, and Industry, Jakarta,  PT. Fikahati Aneska, 2011, p. 95 
5 Ibid., p.96. 
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3) on the use of natural resources for the greatest prosperity of the people, both in the body and 
explanation of the Law of the Republic of Indonesia Year 1945 not specified and explained explicitly. It 
means to exploit this natural wealth, then open the opportunity to be done in the form of cooperation 
with the state, not with local government. In this case the state acts as the "Right-holder" of the people 
in accordance with the mandate of the Constitution; 
4) the necessity of pay attention, whether the right of control of this country, have understanding including 
also can be implemented by state (SOE). 
In order to use the minerals for the greatest prosperity of this people, basically the right of the state 
according to the mandate of the constitution is merely given in the form of rights of control. While the ownership 
of excavated materials remains to the entire people or the nation of Indonesia. 
The existence of the greatest terms of the prosperity of the people is as a consequence of the words 
"controlled by the state" and "used". The word "used" is the purpose of the word "controlled" so that both have a 
causal relationship. Thus, it can be understood that the word "used" as a result of "state control". Both aspects of 
the rule cannot be separated from each other. Both of them are a systematic entity. Right of mastery of state is an 
instrument, while the greatest use of people's prosperity is a goal (objectives). The general term of people's 
prosperity is the continuation or normatification of several terms in the fourth paragraph of the Preamble of the 
1945 Constitution. 
The main role of the state referred to in the welfare state concept is very closely related to the state's right of 
state assets and resources to be carried out in accordance with its functions. According to W. Friedman, the roles 
are as follows:1 
1. State ownership rights positioned the state as a regulator and guarantor of people's welfare. The 
function of the state cannot be separated from one another. It means that it is to let a field of business 
over natural resources to the cooperative; the private sector must be accompanied by special forms of 
control and supervision. Therefore, the obligation to realize the greatest prosperity of the people can 
still be controlled by the state. 
2. State ownership rights provide legitimacy for the state to undertake natural resources related to public 
utilities and public services. On the basis of philosophical considerations (basic spirit of the economy is 
a joint effort and kinship), strategies (public interest), politics (preventing monopoly and oligopoly that 
harm the state economy), economy (efficiency and effectiveness), and for the welfare of the public and 
the amount of prosperity of the people. 
In the implementation of state control, there are aspects of policy as follows: a. Regulation (Regeleensdaad), 
b. Handling (Bestuurdaad), c. Management (Behersdaad), and. Supervision (Toezicthoudensdaad), e. 
Confirmation/determination (Beschikking).2 The five forms of state control in the decision are the function of 
policy and regulation, management and supervision must be interpreted in stratum based on its effectiveness to 
achieve the greatest prosperity of the people. Then, the form of state control of the first rank and the important 
thing is the state direct management of natural resources so that the state gets bigger profits. It can be concluded 
that the mandate of the constitution is that the state shall do direct management of natural resources that affect 
the livelihood of many people. Mineral and coal resources as non-renewable natural resources including natural 
oil and gas resources must be managed directly by SOE.  
For this context, the author agrees to Subianto Tjakrawerdaja point of view. Subianto Tjakrawerdaja3 states 
that the management of oil and natural gas based on Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution must contain seven 
constitutional characteristics, namely: first, the economy aims to achieve the common prosperity of all people; 
this is explicitly explained in the elucidation of Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution. Second, the participation of 
the people in the ownership, production process, and enjoy the results. This is in accordance with the formulation 
contained in Article 33 paragraph (1) and paragraph (4) of the 1945 Constitution. Third, in accordance with the 
principles of Article 33 Paragraph (4) of the 1945 Constitution that is fair efficiency, the economy needs to be 
run by using a fair market mechanism based on fair competition and the role and authority of the state for 
investment in case of market failure. Fourth, the role of the State should be guaranteed, as mandated by Article 
33 Paragraph (1) and Paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution, especially in the case of national economic 
planning, in establishing and enforcing the implementation of the Law, and in the implementation of community 
service and empowerment programs, subsidized and other benefits. Fifth, SOEs as one of the pillars of economic 
activity master the important branches of production and which affect the livelihood of many people. This is 
clearly stated in Article 33 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution. Sixth, the cooperative as a pillar of people's 
economy should be realized in the spirit of togetherness with state-owned and private, and as a people's 
                                                           
1 Tri Hayati, et. all, Concept of State Ownership Rrights in Natural Resources Sector Based on Article 33 of the 1945 Indonesian Constitution, 
Jakarta, SekJen MKRI and CLGS FHUI, 2005, p.17. 
2 The Decision of the Constitutional Court of Indonesia, June 2011.  
3 Subiakto Tjakrawerdaja is an observer Cooperative and ex-Ministry of Cooperative in Soeharto Era. See Subiakto Tjakrawerdaya, “Waiting 
the Umbrella Law of National Economy” ,  Reform Review, Volume II Nomor 1 April-Juni 2008, p. 40. 
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economic enterprise. Seventh, the national economy should be a manifestation of an equal partnership between 
cooperatives, state-owned enterprises and the private sector. This principle is contained in Article 33 Paragraph 
(1) of the 1945 Constitution. It is these constitutional characteristics that should be translated into the whole set 
of oil and natural gas legislation regulations. 
The greatest prosperity of the people is the goal of every management and use of national natural resources. 
This objective is seen as a non-negligible interest. In addition to constitutional mandate, it is also coveted by 
every citizen and is the responsibility of the state as a consequence of the right of control of the state itself. 
Therefore, every exploitation and use of natural resources is tailored to the objectives (doelmatig). 
 
4.2.State Control of Oil and Gas Management 
The existing forms of oil and gas management cooperation can be classified into four forms: 
a. Concession Agreements (Cas); 
b. Joint Venture Contracts (JVCs); 
c. Services Contracts (SCs); and 
d. Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs). 
Tabel 1 
Comparative of Ownership, Control, and Risks of Concession Agreement (CAs)  
and Production Sharing Agreement (PSAs) 
 Cas PSAs 
Ownership Control Risk Ownership Control Risk 
International Oil Company (IOCs) Yes  Full  Full  Shared  Full  Full Risk 
Host State No  No  No  Shared  No  No Risk 
 
Tabel 2 
Comparative of Ownership, Control, and Risks of Cooperation of Service Contract (SCs) 
 PSC RSC 
Ownership  Control  Risk  Ownership  Control  Risk  
International Oil Company (IOCs) No  No  No  No  No  Exploration  
Host State Full  Full  All Risk Full  Full  All Risk 
To illustrate the differences between each of the international forms of cooperation in oil and gas 
management as described above, it can be stated in Table 1. As for oil and gas management agreement by using 
service contract, a comparison table between pure service contracts and service contracts with risks as shown in 
table 2 can be presented. 
 
4.3 Practice of Oil and Gas Management in Some Countries 
The oil and gas industry of a country differs from one another in terms of how the roles and responsibilities of 
three functions are: policy, regulation and commercial functions (business). Some countries strictly divide the 
function, such as Norway, and Brazil. In Norway, the policy function is handled by the Ministry of Petroleum 
and Energy, the regulatory function under the Petroleum Directorate and the commercial functions carried out by 
the national oil company (NOC) together with the IOC. Similarly in Brazil, the three functions are strictly 
separated.1 
In some countries, there is no strict separation of the three functions, but one and other functions, such as 
Saudi Arabia and Malaysia, the NOC (Saudi Aramco and Petronas) play a very dominant role. It has not only 
played commercial function, but also it plays regulation function. Instead Venezuela, the Petroleum Ministry 
played a more dominant role. Before the Chavez era became President in 1998, the role of the NOC was already 
too strong and joined politics against Chavez's rise. Since 1999, the dominance of PDVSA has been reduced, the 
regulatory function is then returned to the Petroleum Ministry. Meanwhile, in Iran the dominance between the 
NOC (National Iranian Oil Company / NIOC) and the Ministry is relatively balanced.2 In developing countries, 
the commercial role is generally carried out by NOCs, both individual and with the IOC. While in the OECD 
countries, such as USA, UK, Australia and Canada, the state does not go directly into the oil and gas business 
through NOCs (no NOCs in those countries), so that pure commercial functions are undertaken by private 
parties.3 
In Bolivia, through the new oil and gas law (2005), the royalties rose to 18% and Direct Tax On 
Hydrocarbon (DTH) by 32%, thus totaling 50% of total production. Especially for large field, added with the 
                                                           
1 Benny Lubiantara, Economy of Oil and Gas: Review of Commercial of  Oil and Gas Contract,  Jakarta, PT. Gramedia Widiasarana 
Indonesia, 2012 , pp.. 127-146. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
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participation of the government by 32% so the total to 82%. Comparing with PSC conditions in Indonesia where 
85%: 15% (oil) and 70%: 30% (gas) is divided, certainly not apple to apple because 85% and 70% of the 
Indonesian government share is net profit. When calculated from gross revenues, of course the presentation is 
not that great, still far below Bolivia which is 82%. The division of Bolivian model is indeed unusually high for 
the state, but still implemented because it is known exactly the cost structure. So, it only costs to production and 
does not need to invest capital. It supposes a production cost of 10% of gross income, then the company still 
makes a profit of 8% of gross income. The 82% model in Bolivia applies to large fields currently in production, 
thus there is no exploration risk. If this concept is offered for the new block that has been explored, certainly no 
investor is interested. Full risk exploration activities, when commercial reserves are found once access to gross 
income is limited to a maximum of 18%. Investors will certainly re-think, when their investment costs will return.  
The Indonesian PSC model is divided into 85%: 15% (oil) and 70%: 30% (gas). It is for full cycle activity 
from exploration to production. Compared to other countries, revenue share including the tax has been very good. 
What happened in Bolivia and some other Latin American countries basically is inseparable from the existence 
of unfair contracts made in the past.1 
In Brazil related to the arrangement of investor cooperation in the framework of exploration and 
exploitation activities, through oil and gas law in 1997, it only mentioned the concession system. Therefore, the 
PSC system has never been there. So the authorities in Brazil began to examine the contracting system used by 
other countries which led to the debate about the two choices that still use the concession system with 
modification or move to the PSC system.  
The debate raises the pros and cons among academics who still want the concession system. They argue 
that the system is successful for decades, if the government feels the need to obtain a larger portion. It can be 
done by doing a little modification without having to move to the PSC system. While supporters of the PSC 
system assume that concession systems are only suitable for work areas that have large geological risks, while 
sub-salt basins, as they have many findings, the risks are relatively small. Even though both systems can provide 
an equal share of revenue for the government, but the arrangement of the division will be easier in the PSC 
model due to there is a profit-share element (oil share profile). In July 2009, authorities announced that the 
government would move to the PSC system by forming a new national company specifically established for 
subsalt basin development. No explanation of the reasons for the formation of a new national company is 
required, but this is expected due to the status of Petrobras. Although known as a national company, Petrobras is 
not 100% state-owned. The government portion is only 48%, the rest is owned by foreign and national private 
investors. The establishment of a 100% state-owned new company is intended to maximize the total government 
share of upstream activities in the subsalt basin.2 
It is clear that what happened in Brazil is contrary to the situation in Indonesia. Firstly, oil and gas 
exploration in Brazil is a big success, but the opposite situation occurs in the country. Secondly, Brazil considers 
the PSC, while in Indonesia the government is busy looking for a system other than PSC for cost recovery 
reasons. Brazil's move so far is right, because the first stage for them is how to invite investors to oil and gas 
exploration with the terms and conditions of interest. In contrast, in Indonesia too busy looking for contracts that 
benefit the state, while at the same time exploration performance is less encouraging. 
Oil and gas management in Norway only recognizes the concession system from scratch to obtain a portion 
of the government from the oil and gas industry. Norway relies solely on their sophisticated administrative 
system of taxation, so the use of PSCs is deemed unnecessary. Although the use of concessions and government 
sections is derived only from taxes, the total share of government revenue is large. Income tax of 28%, plus other 
taxes – called - Special Petroleum Tax (50%) of net income, thus the marginal tax rate is 78%. At the 
international level, the share of government revenue is a high category, especially compared to blocks or oil and 
gas fields in other countries using the concession system. For investors, although the share of government 
revenue is quite high, the Norway concession system is considered attractive because elements of government 
revenue are derived from the bank, unlike royalties imposed on gross income. Taxes are imposed on net income; 
such systems are known as back-end loaded, which tend to be preferred by investors. The simplicity of the 
physical framework for the oil and gas industry in Norway can work well, notwithstanding the reality that an 
advanced governance system.  
 
4. Conclusion 
The right to control by the state must be in accordance with the purpose of the Welfare State as stipulated in 
Article 33 Paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. The relationship with the right of 
state control with the greatest prosperity of the people will realize the obligations of the state, among others, that 
all forms of utilization of natural resources should significantly enhance prosperity and prosperity. State 
                                                           
1 Ibid. 
2 Juajir Sumardi, Op.Cit. pp..27-28. 
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ownership rights positioned the state as a regulator and guarantor of people's welfare. The function of the state 
cannot be separated from one another. It is to let a field of business over natural resources to the cooperative; the 
private sector must be accompanied by special forms of control and supervision. Therefore, the obligation to 
realize the greatest prosperity of the people can still be controlled by the state . The control of the state 
interpreted as the people collectively constructed by the 1945 Constitution mandates the state to make policies 
(beleid) and the act of administering (bestuurdaad), regeneration (regelensdaad), management (beheersdaad), 
and supervision for the greatest purpose of people's prosperity. The five forms of state control in the decision 
that is the function of policy and management, regulation and management and supervision should be interpreted 
in stratum based on effectivity to achieve the size of people's prosperity. 
Therefore, the role and responsibility of the State in the management of oil and gas in the border of 
Indonesia should be oriented to the prosperity of the people of Indonesia. However, it is not yet optimal because 
the Law No. 22 of 2001 concerning Oil and Gas is very liberal which is more profitable to foreign investors than 
the national interest of Indonesia. 
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